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Abstract
In recent years, whole genome sequencing (WGS)
evolved from a futuristic-sounding research project to
an increasingly affordable technology for determining
complete genome sequences of complex organisms,
including humans. This prompts a wide range of rev-
olutionary applications, as WGS is a promising means
for improving modern healthcare and providing a bet-
ter understanding of the human genome, in particu-
lar its relation to diseases and response to treatments.
However, this progress raises worrisome privacy and
ethical issues, since, besides uniquely identifying its
owner, the genome contains a treasure trove of highly
personal and sensitive information.
In this article, after summarizing recent advances in
genomics, we discuss some important privacy issues
associated with human genomic information and iden-
tify a number of particularly relevant research chal-
lenges.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed impressive advances
in DNA sequencing. Both throughput and afford-
ability of new-generation sequencing platforms have
increased at a pace faster than Moore’s Law would
otherwise predict. It seems quite reasonable to as-
sume that, in a few years, most individuals in devel-
oped countries will have the means of having their
genomes sequenced, thus enabling personalized ge-
nomic medicine and facilitating preventive treatment
and diagnosis.
However, for now this remains only a prospect and
much more research is needed to understand the very
complex relationship between genome and health. To
conduct this research, the scientific community needs
large cohorts of patients (or volunteers) willing to
share their genetic material. One example is the Per-
sonal Genome Project, wherein all participants must
agree to have their genomic data – along with other
personal information – made publicly available on the
Internet. This clearly raises many potential privacy,
ethical, and legal concerns.
The first documented case of privacy issues dates
back to the end of the 19th century. It was triggered by
the availability of a new and revolutionary observation
and identification tool: the photo camera. Since then,
several other such tools have become widespread, in-
cluding: video cameras, credit cards, Web browsers,
and mobile phones. These tools reveal our presence
and habits in various spheres of life, as well as our
communication and mobility patterns. DNA sequenc-
ing greatly exacerbates this problem, as the genome
represents our ultimate biological identity. By com-
bining genomic data with information about one’s en-
vironment or lifestyle (often easily obtainable from so-
cial networks), could make it possible to infer that in-
dividual’s phenotype.
In general, access to genomic data prompts some
important privacy concerns: (i) DNA reflects infor-
mation about genetic conditions and predispositions
to specific diseases such as Alzheimer’s, cancer, or
schizophrenia, (ii) DNA contains information about
ancestors, siblings, and progeny, (iii) DNA (almost)
does not change over time, hence revoking or replac-
ing it (as with other forms of identification) is impossi-
ble, and (iv) DNA analysis is already being used both
in law enforcement and healthcare, thus prompting nu-
merous ethical issues. Furthermore, it is hard to assess
or estimate the extent of the personal information that
could be extracted or derived from the genome in the
future. (At the same time, it does not take a great leap
of faith to believe that it will be impressive).
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In this article, after a brief summary of some basic
genomic concepts, we describe some expected benefits
of personalized medicine and discuss notable privacy
issues, as well as associated research challenges.
2 Background
The human genome is encoded in double stranded
DNA molecules consisting of two complementary
polymer chains. Each chain consists of simple units
called nucleotides (A,C,G,T). The DNA of a person
can be retrieved from various sources (e.g., saliva, hair,
skin, blood). Once a sample is collected, the genetic
material is extracted and then sequenced – using a
DNA sequencing platform – to obtain the so-called
raw DNA sequence. This is usually in the form of short
reads, each including hundreds of nucleotides from
random parts of the genome. Next, the raw reads are
quality-controlled, analyzed, and aligned to the refer-
ence genome (digital nucleic acid sequence database,
assembled by scientists as a representative example of
our species’ set of genes), allowing the progressive re-
construction of the whole sequenced genome. After
further analysis of these short reads, eventually, the 3.2
billion letters in the DNA sequence of the person are
reconstructed.
Even though most of the DNA sequence is con-
served across the whole human population, around
0.5% of each person’s DNA (which corresponds to
several millions of nucleotides) is different from the
reference genome, owing to genetic variations. Single
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) is the most common
DNA variation. A SNP is a position in the genome
holding a nucleotide that varies between individuals.
Currently, there are approximately 40 million con-
firmed SNPs in the human population [24] and this
number is increasing very rapidly. Multiple Genome-
Wide Association Studies (GWAS) performed in re-
cent years have shown that a patient’s susceptibility to
particular diseases can be partially predicted from sets
of his SNPs [20, 10]. For example, it was reported
that there are three genes bearing a total of ten particu-
lar SNPs necessary to (partially) analyze susceptibility
to Alzheimer’s disease [29]. Thus, leakage of SNPs
poses a significant threat to genomic privacy.
An interesting characteristic of the SNPs, called
Linkage Disequilibrium (LD) [11], poses a notable pri-
vacy threat. LD is observed whenever SNPs are not
independent of each other. Therefore, the content of
a SNP position (i.e., nucleotides residing at that SNP
position) can be inferred from the contents of other
SNP positions using the LD relationship. The most
well-known example of the aforementioned threat is
the ApoE status of Jim Watson (the co-discoverer of
DNA), who published his genome with the exception
of his ApoE gene (which carries SNPs to determine
the risk for Alzheimer’s disease). However, it was later
shown that these SNPs on his ApoE gene can be (prob-
abilistically) inferred using their LD relationships with
the published ones [26].
3 Towards Personalized Medicine,
and Beyond
Widespread and affordable availability of fully se-
quenced human genomes creates enormous opportuni-
ties, which we summarize in Fig. 1 (and discuss in this
section).
In particular, whole genome sequencing (WGS) fa-
cilitates the advent of a new era of predictive, pre-
ventive, participatory, and personalized medicine (“P4
medicine”) [19]. Personalized genomic medicine is
recognized as a significant paradigm shift and a major
trend in health care [34], where treatment and medica-
tion type/dosage would be tailored to the precise ge-
netic makeup of individual patients.
For instance, certain genetic mutations are known
to alter drug metabolism, thus genomic tests are often
used today to predict a patient’s response to particu-
lar drugs. The study of the impact of genetic varia-
tions on the response to medications is called pharma-
cogenomics. A well-known example in this direction
includes testing for SNP mutations in the tpmt gene
for childhood leukemia patients, prior to prescribing
6-Mercaptopurine and Azathioprine drugs. The tpmt
gene codes for the TPMT enzyme that metabolizes
these drugs. Moreover, genetic polymorphisms affect-
ing enzymatic activity of TPMT are correlated with
variations in sensitivity and toxicity response to such
drugs. Other common examples include pre-testing
for Zelboraf (Roche’s treatment for advanced skin can-
cer), as well as pre-treatment testing for Philadelphia
chromosome mutations related to Acute Lymphoblas-
tic Leukemia (ALL) and BRCA1/BRCA2 genes in
correlation to familial breast and ovarian cancer syn-
dromes. Experts estimate that about a third of the
900 cancer drugs currently in clinical trials could soon
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Figure 1: Applications of genomics.
come to market with a recommendation for a DNA or
other molecular test attached [6].
Furthermore, Vanderbilt University’s PREDICT
program (Pharmacogenomic Resource for Enhanced
Decisions in Care and Treatment) [23] helps physi-
cians tell which drugs are most likely to work for their
patients, and which they should avoid, based on the
genetic characteristics of the patients, instead of long
trial and error periods. For instance, [35] reports how
a specific cholesterol-lowering drug was successfully
selected based on the genomic profile of a patient with
coronary artery disease.
Experts predict that advances in WGS will fur-
ther stimulate the development of personalized
medicine [15]. Commercial companies, like Knome,
already offer services that take raw genome data and
create usable reports for doctors. In general, the avail-
ability of a patient’s fully sequenced genome will en-
able clinicians, doctors, and testing facilities to run a
number of complex, correlated genetic tests in a mat-
ter of seconds, using specialized computational algo-
rithms (as opposed to more expensive and slower in
vitro tests).
The democratization of low-cost whole genome
genotyping and sequencing provides individuals with
direct access to their genomic information, including
to some genetic disease risk tests. For example, a
well-known commercial company, 23andMe [1], pro-
vides relatively low-cost genetic disease risk tests for
960,000 specific SNPs. In Fig. 2, we illustrate the ge-
netic disease risk results of a real human with fictional
name “Greg Mendel” (whose genomic data is publicly
available in the “demo mode”) provided by 23andMe.
This table mainly shows the diseases for which Greg
Mendel’s calculated risk is higher relative to average.
In [32], Topol mentions a few real stories about how
the disease risk values obtained from 23andMe helped
early diagnosis of serious diseases (e.g., prostate can-
cer).
Figure 2: Genetic risks of Greg Mendel for several diseases
(source: 23andMe).
The availability of whole human genomes will also
facilitate a number of genetic tests that today are per-
formed in vitro by reducing costs and time. For in-
stance, genetic paternity tests might be run very effi-
ciently in computation, by designing algorithms that
emulate in vitro, are highly accurate, and court ad-
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missible. Furthermore, ancestry and genealogical
testing is already offered by several commercial en-
tities, which use publicly available genomic data from
individuals belonging to different ethnic groups, and
compare them against their customers’ genomic infor-
mation to understand how they relate to known eth-
nic groups. Similarly, genetic compatibility tests,
which let potential or existing partners assess the risk
of transmitting to their children a genetic disease with
Mendelian inheritance [22], are offered by various on-
line services.
4 Privacy and Ethical Pitfalls
While advances in whole genome sequencing are
paving the way to extraordinary progress in health-
care (and beyond), they also prompt serious privacy,
ethical, and security concerns. Besides uniquely
identifying its owner, a genome contains information
about one’s ethnic heritage, predisposition to numer-
ous physical and mental health conditions as well as
other phenotypic traits [12, 7, 14]. We illustrate two
main privacy threats to genomic data in Fig. 3.
Traditional approaches to privacy, such as de-
identification or aggregation [21], are ineffective in
the genomic context, since the genome itself is the
ultimate identifier [18]. For instance, a recent study
by Gymrek et al. [16] demonstrated the feasibil-
ity of re-identifying DNA donors from a public re-
search database using information available from pop-
ular genealogy Web sites and other available informa-
tion. Additional work on genomic re-identification in-
cludes [28] and [18].
The privacy problem is further exacerbated by the
fact that genomes of any two closely related individ-
uals are 99.9% identical, in contrast with 99.5%, on
average, for two random people. Thus, the disclosure
of one’s genome leads to the leakage of significant ge-
nomic information about that person’s close relatives,
including parents, siblings and offspring. This is a
problem regardless of how the disclosure occurs: vol-
untarily, accidentally or maliciously. This makes ge-
nomic privacy a unique problem since, in most other
privacy-sensitive scenarios, only the individual’s data
is at stake, while in the genomic context, disclosure of
personal information impacts a potentially large group
of individuals. The most recent example of this is-
sue is the controversy between the family members
of deceased Henrietta Lacks (whose genome was se-
quenced and published after her death, without getting
the permission of her family) and the scientists who
are in favor of publishing genomes online for research
purposes [31].
Even more worrying is that consequences of ge-
nomic data disclosure are not limited in time. In some
other cases of leakage of one’s private information,
some recourse is possible. For example, bank account
numbers and passwords can be changed, physical or
electronic documents (even public key certificates) can
be replaced and old ones can be revoked. In contrast,
a genome is not mutable nor “revokable”. Moreover,
as large portions thereof are passed on to future gen-
erations, disclosure of one’s genomic information can
turn into an endless curse for both current and future
generations.
Based on the above, it is not surprising that privacy
concerns represent a formidable obstacle for assem-
bling large human genomic databases, e.g., for the pur-
pose of conducting Genome-Wide Association Studies
(GWAS). More generally, privacy concerns might ac-
tually stand in the way of advances in medicine and
consequent improvements in overall healthcare. The
same could apply in the domain of law enforcement
where DNA-based identification is being increasingly
used and there is a need for secure and reliable han-
dling of large numbers of genomes.
On the part of the US federal government, there
has been awareness of privacy and ethical issues in
genomics. For example, as early as 1990, the Na-
tional Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI)
established the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications
(ELSI) Research Program with the goal of exploring
repercussions of advances in genetic and genomic re-
search on individuals, families and communities.
Federal laws, such as the 2003 Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), provide
a general framework for protecting and sharing Pro-
tected Health Information (PHI). Furthermore, the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)
adopted in 1998 prohibits discrimination on the basis
of genetic information with respect to health insurance
and employment [33]. Also, some states, like Cali-
fornia, have recently started to consider DNA privacy
laws [30].
Even the popular culture, via sci-fi movies and lit-
erature, has touched upon genetic discrimination. For
instance, the notion of genism that originated in the
1997 movie “GATTACA”, denotes the theory that dis-
Figure 3: Main threats to human genomic data: (i) de-anonymization of the DNA donors from a public research database,
and (ii) leakage of genomic data, and hence leakage of privacy-sensitive information.
tinctive human characteristics and abilities are deter-
mined by genes, resulting in discrimination as perni-
cious as racism [2].
While providing general guidelines, current legis-
lation does not offer sufficient technical information
about safe and secure ways of storing and processing
digitized genomes. We believe that security and pri-
vacy issues for genomic data (in the context of both
individual genomes and databases thereof) are timely,
important and relatively poorly understood.
Privacy practitioners and consumer organizations
are strongly advocating the need for more restrictive
legislation as a result of gaps in current policies. A re-
cent report from the Presidential Commission for the
Study of Bioethical Issues [27] analyzed advances of
whole genome sequencing, and highlighted growing
privacy and security concerns. This report makes a
few privacy and security recommendations, including,
unfortunately, de-identification.
At the policy level, challenges include the need for
informed consent to guard against surreptitious DNA
testing. Authorities and companies should obtain writ-
ten permission from citizens before collecting, analyz-
ing, storing or sharing their genetic information, e.g.,
preventing collection of hair or saliva samples and us-
ing them for unauthorized sequencing.
On the other hand, some academics fear that restric-
tive (privacy-friendly) measures could seriously hin-
der genomic research. Scientists typically sequence
DNA from large numbers of people in order to deter-
mine genes associated with particular diseases. The
informed consent restriction would mean that large ge-
nomic datasets could not be re-used to study a dif-
ferent disease; researchers would either need to de-
stroy the data after each study, or track down all pre-
viously enrolled study participants for each new au-
thorization. Also, the similarity of related individu-
als’ genome raises doubts as to whether or not relatives
should also provide consent.
Finally, the collection and analysis of human
genomes does not arise only in the contexts of research
studies and improved healthcare. It also comes up in
increasingly popular commercial (for-profit) applica-
tions, which are not well-regulated so far. An example
is genepartner.om, which claims to do matchmak-
ing based on unclear genetic features.
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5 Open Research Problems
As discussed above, advances in genomics will soon
result in large numbers of individuals having their
genomes sequenced and obtaining digitized versions
thereof. This poses a wide range of technical prob-
lems, which we explore below.
Storage and Accessibility: Genome at Rest. Due to
its sensitivity and size (about 3.2 billion nucleotides),
one key challenge is where and how a digitized
genome should be stored. It is reasonable to assume
that an individual who requests (and likely pays for)
genome sequencing should own the result, as is al-
ready the case with any other personal medical results
and information. This raises numerous issues, includ-
ing:
(1) Should the genome be stored on one’s personal de-
vices, e.g., a PC or a smartphone? If so, what,
if any, special hardware security features (e.g.,
tamper-resistance) are needed?
(2) Can it be outsourced to a cloud provider?
(3) Should the sequencing facility keep an escrowed
copy of the genome?
(4) Should it be entrusted to one’s personal physician
and/or health insurance provider?
(5) How is it to be stored: in the clear or encrypted?
If the latter, where are encryption keys generated:
at the lab? at owner’s premises? at the cloud
provider? Where are these keys stored?
(6) How to guarantee integrity and authenticity of
the digitized genome (i.e., guarantee that it cor-
responds to its actual owner)?
(7) Should backups be made? If so, how often and
where can copies be kept?
(8) How can one erase a genome securely?
(9) Should an individual periodically re-sequence
their genome to take advantage of more accurate
technology?
Privacy: Genome in Action. Given the genome’s
sensitivity, an individual should, ideally, never dis-
close any information contained therein. However, this
would prevent the access to any genomic application
that cannot be entirely and securely performed in situ,
i.e., within a secure perimeter of one’s own personal
device. In principle, this might be possible if opera-
tions are performed in some standardized and certified
form. For example, if testing for a genetic disease re-
quires matching a well-known pattern in some approx-
imate location in the genome, that pattern and its pa-
rameters can be certified by some trusted agency (such
as the US Food and Drug Administration). Thus, an
individual could be assured that a legitimate test for
a specific genetic disease is being conducted and the
result is clearly communicated to that individual; the
latter would then have the option to keep the result pri-
vate.
Due to the sensitivity of genomic data, research on
the privacy of genomic data has accelerated over the
past few years. We can put this research in four main
categories: (i) private string searching and compari-
son [5], (ii) private release of aggregate data [36], (iii)
private alignment of raw genomic data [9], and (iv)
private clinical usage of genomic data (e.g., for per-
sonalized medicine) [3, 4].
Nonetheless, it is hard to foresee the range and com-
plexity of future genetic operations: some (future)
tests might be too computationally complex to be per-
formed within the confines of a personal device. Fur-
thermore, some genetic testing would probably involve
multiple genomes, e.g., when tracing origins of some
conditions, siblings or parents/children might need to
be tested together. Similarly, in assessing risks of
genetic conditions for future progeny, both prospec-
tive parents have to be tested. Also, some genetic
tests often constitute a trademark of a pharmaceuti-
cal/biomedical company, whose intellectual property
needs to be protected – for more details, see [25, 17, 8].
As soon as genomic information leaves the (vir-
tual) hands of its owner, purely technical approaches
to privacy become insufficient. Legal and profes-
sional guidelines would certainly be needed to govern
how information is transmitted, stored, processed, and
eventually disposed of on the receiving end, e.g., by
the physician, hospital, pharmacist or medical lab.
Long-term data protection. Even if genomes are
encrypted (at rest), encryption schemes considered
strong today might gradually weaken in the long
term, whereas genome sensitivity does not dissipate
over time. It is not too far-fetched to imagine that
a third-party in possession of an encrypted genome
might be able, e.g., 30 or 50 years later, to de-
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crypt it. For instance, the Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) scheme supports key lengths up to 256
bits – a key length estimated by NIST, following
Moore’s law, to be secure several years after 2030
(http://www.keylength.com/en/4/). However, com-
putational breakthroughs or newly discovered weak-
nesses of the encryption algorithm might allow break-
ing the encryption earlier than expected. Also, even
many years from now, the leakage of an individual’s
genome, although deceased, may still severely affect
the privacy of his or her progeny.
If one assumes that an encrypted genome will not
be copied, then the genome could be periodically re-
encrypted in time. Alternatively, one could split the
genome, using secret-sharing techniques, and parti-
tion it among several providers; however, it remains
an open question how to efficiently reassemble the
genome for various operations as well as how to guar-
antee non-collusion between providers.
Accuracy and Accountability: Computational ge-
nomic tests should guarantee accuracy comparable to
current analog in vitro equivalents. For example, a
software implementation of the paternity test on dig-
itized genomes should offer at least the same confi-
dence as its in vitro counterpart currently admissible
in a court of law. Also, computational tests should aim
at accountability, e.g., by providing lasting guarantees
that tests are run correctly and on intended genomic
information.
Efficiency. Computational genomic tests should in-
cur minimal communication/computational costs. Ar-
guably, minimality in this setting is relative to the con-
text of such tests. For instance, patients may be in-
clined (and used) to wait several days to obtain results
of genetic tests that concern their health, however in
the computational setting, long running times on per-
sonal devices might hinder the real-world practicality
of these tests (besides taking out one of the main mo-
tivations for computational tests.)
Usability. Computational genomic tests that involve
end-users should be usable by, and meaningful to, reg-
ular non-tech-savvy individuals. This translates into
non-trivial questions, such as: how much understand-
ing should be expected from a user running a test?
What information (and at what level of granularity)
should be presented to the user as part of a test and
as its outcome? Do privacy perceptions and concerns
experienced by patients correspond to what the scien-
tific community would expect? For instance, one may
think that patients will be likely to trade off privacy of
their genomes to enable tests that can save them from,
e.g., cancer. However, only little work, e.g., [13] has
focused on users’ concerns and (mis)proven common
beliefs to this regard, thus pointing out the need for
ethnographic studies in the field. Also, it remains an
open problem to explore effective ways to communi-
cate to the users the potential privacy risks associated
with genomic information and its disclosure.
Large-scale research on human genomes. As dis-
cussed in Section 4, potential privacy, legal, and ethical
concerns appear to conflict with enabling large-scale
research on human genomes, such as Genome-Wide
Association Studies (GWAS). Such scale is however
required for researchers to discover associations be-
tween genetic make-up and medical conditions. One
current trend is to store donors’ genomes in clouds and
use analytics techniques running on powerful com-
puter clusters. Once again, this prompts many privacy
and legal concerns (also relevant to relatives and de-
scendants).
6 Conclusion
This paper discussed some “chills and thrills” of an
emerging phenomenon – affordable and readily avail-
able genomic sequencing. As something radically
novel, it brings great opportunities and significant con-
cerns, especially (as we have shown) pertaining to
personal privacy. Mitigating privacy issues will re-
quire long-term collaboration among geneticists, other
healthcare providers, ethicists, lawmakers, and com-
puter scientists. We believe that this collaboration will
not occur naturally and, in order to foster it, funding
agencies need to target this topic. Until recently, at
least in the United States, genomic privacy unfortu-
nately fell into a sort of a “funding gap” between sev-
eral agencies. One obvious candidate for playing a key
funding role is the National Institute of Health (NIH).
Yet, although it covers bioinformatics, NIH has not
funded privacy research in the genomic context. The
National Science Foundation (NSF), the main agency
responsible for funding academic computer-science
research, recently initiated a “Smart and Connected
Health” program that includes so-called “integrative
projects” requiring collaboration among computer and
health sciences. It remains to be seen whether this
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program will engender long-range genomic privacy re-
search. Other US funding agencies have not, thus far,
targeted genomic privacy. A similar situation can be
observed in Europe: of course, there are numerous EU
and nationally funded projects focusing on e-health,
some of which address data protection. However, the
genomic privacy challenge has been vastly overlooked,
and the number of computer scientists working on the
topic is even lower than in the United States. An ad-
ditional issue is that, although most officials in charge
of data protection typically have a strong legal back-
ground, they lack computer science expertise. As a
consequence, they tend to rely on legislation more than
on technology.
In conclusion, if not addressed, privacy issues high-
lighted in this article could affect numerous individ-
uals. Moreover, by impeding genomic research, it
would also affect the well-being of our society as a
whole. Thus, we believe that there is an urgent need
for collaboration among researchers in the fields out-
lined above.
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